

We're on the Wrong Side Again

Several weeks ago, I visited an East Bengali refugee camp near Calcutta and an incident there stuck in my mind. I haven't previously written about it—because, I think, I didn't know quite what to make of it.

Here I was, with war clearly imminent, in this besieged corner of the world, surrounded by a crowd of intense Bengalis with whom I felt strangely comfortable.

Only a few spoke English. They said they had been school teachers in a small town on the Pakistani side of the border. A half-dozen others participated in the conversation, but the school teachers acted as interpreters and carried the argument. They were uncommonly intelligent and thoughtful.

In its level of sophistication and courtesy, this was like a Washington cocktail party—but make no mistake: These were men consumed by deep emotions. With a dignity that belied their tattered clothing, they conveyed genuine bewilderment.

"I don't understand," said the most eloquent among them, as I reconstruct the conversation, "why you Americans are doing this. The Pakistani army has come into our land with your guns and is killing us with your ammunition. I have lost a brother-in-law and an uncle. Everyone here has lost part of his family."

"I don't understand because I was brought up looking to America as the land of democracy and of freedom. We learned about Lincoln and Washington in our schools. For us, America has always stood for what we wanted for ourselves. I have never been near America, but I learned to love it."

"We keep thinking that you don't know what the Pakistani army is doing—and that if you did, you would put a stop to it. Even now, I can't hate America. We still look to it with hope. But why is America helping the Pakistani army to murder us?"

What I began to wonder was how many times since World War II these same sentiments had been expressed—in the villages of Cuba, China, the Dominican Republic, Vietnam, as we took up the cause of

Batista, Chiang, Trujillo, Diem.

Tyrants every one of them, but to say it now has the passionate ring of Tom Paine ("Tyranny, like hell, is not easily conquered; yet we have this consolation with us, that the harder the conflict, the more glorious the triumph.")—and this is an age when it is fashionable not to be passionate but to be cool.

Indeed, we were told by the John Foster Dulleses and even the John Fitzgerald Kennedys that we were engaged in an epic struggle for men's minds—but then we summarily dismissed men's minds as being of no importance, and gravitated to where we thought the power lay.

How cool we were, proclaiming our dedication to the Free World—while sending out our CIA, our military advisory groups, our Green Berets and sometimes our Army and Navy to rescue tyrants from the mobilized force of men's minds. We said we were idealists, but we took pride in being tough-minded and practical.

But, being so tough-minded, were we really practical? We have almost invariably been on the losing side in these domestic struggles. Something has gone wrong.

We have, I believe, ignored our most potent weapon—the inherent esteem held for our system by most of the common people of the world. What we used instead were self-defeating weapons—the same dirty tricks used by our enemies.

As a practical matter, we might justify supporting Pakistan if there were any prospect that it could re-establish its rule over East Bengal. But—during the weeks and months that we silently sanctioned its tyranny—that prospect vanished.

Right now, the Bangla Desh rebellion is essentially free and democratic. It may not long remain that way. Anti-democratic elements within it—favorable to the Soviet Union—may emerge as the dominant force.

But what we are doing, while incurring the wrath of the Indians, is to increase substantially the odds that the regime which ultimately takes

Bangla Desh will be defiantly against us.

I fail to see the American self-interest in appearing before the world as the champion of Pakistan's Yahya Kahn. Like Batista et al., he's not only a tyrant but a loser. When my East Bengali friend in the refugee camp asks, "Why, America?", with the same bewilderment I am forced to answer: "I don't know."

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We Have to Stay in the Dirty Business of Spying

That bombshell out of Great Britain about the expulsion of 105 Soviet diplomats and officials for spying has had one predictable effect.

It has revived editorial comment and cocktail chatter about our own Central Intelligence Agency and the "coverers" it uses for spies. And it has aroused new spasms of naive comment to the effect that our country ought to get out of the cloak-and-dagger business.

Well, just as sure as Mata Hari was a woman, the expulsions will not halt massive Soviet spying in Britain — or in the United States, at the United Nations or anywhere else.

Some Americans just can't get over the sanctimonious notion that spying is a dirty business that, like dandruff, we can wash right out of our hair.

Some spying is a sordid, dangerous business. It involves blackmail, sexual entrapment, peeping tomism, double-crosses, political and character assassinations — and outright murder.

Yet, spying is not nearly as bad as are some of the alternatives to having a good system of intelligence. Not many Americans would accept vulnerability to a sneak nuclear attack as the price for getting rid of spies.

The fact is that if we are to move closer to peace we are likely to go through a period of more spying rather than less.

Millions of sensitive, intelligent Americans deplore the fact that in the decade of the 1960s the United States and Soviet Union poured a trillion dollars into arms. These Americans know that we shall never rescue our cities or save man's environment or find a cure for cancer unless we can

stop the arms race and its mad waste of wealth.

But the glaring truth is that distrust stands in the way of a certifiably in the manufacture of horrible weapons, not to mention the destruction of those already in arsenals. Steps toward disarmament will proceed only as rapidly as intelligence procedures make it possible for rival countries to be reasonably sure that they will not be destroyed by the perfidy of a potential enemy.

As far ahead as man can see, the United States and the Soviet Union will launch sophisticated satellites whose fantastic cameras will record troop movements, missile emplacements, production centers for fissionable materials, weapons storage areas and other vital information bearing on the other country's (or China's) intentions.

It is taken for granted by American officials that the Soviet Union will keep 30 or so trawlers operating off the shores of the United States, their powerful, sensitive electronic gear intercepting U.S. diplomatic and military messages, picking up conversation at U.S. airfields and bases, or even plotting the noise patterns emanating from key U.S. cities.

The Soviets likewise take it for granted that the United

States will use ships like the USS Pueblo, special aircraft and other measures to conduct electronic intelligence — and that it will go on spending billions to intercept other countries, messages and break their codes.

John F. Kennedy was frightened by Khrushchev at Vienna because intelligence told the young President that we were not as prepared to fight as we needed to be should the Russian carry out his threats regarding Berlin. Later, Kennedy could stand eyeball-to-eyeball with Khrushchev during the Cuban missile crisis because intelligence operations, including the U2 flights of the Eisenhower years, made it clear that the United States was stronger if it came to nuclear war. Moreover, our intelligence was such that we knew Khrushchev knew who was stronger.

President Nixon will go to Peking with greater feelings of confidence because sophisticated intelligence procedures have made it possible for him to know many things that the Chinese do not know he knows.

There are "puritans" who say that they can never accept this as a necessary activity, for to do so would be to compromise with immorality and indecency. So it becomes a ritual of cleanliness for them to launch attacks on the CIA and other American intelligence operations whenever a news item pops up to remind them of their revulsion to "dirty tricks."

But that story out of London is just another reminder of how mean the real world is — and that the peacemakers very often are those who keep us alert to both the dangers and the promises of that real world.

Dont Blame CIA

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The Central Intelligence Agency should receive none of the blame for creating crises in foreign lands, W. Averell Harriman, one of America's senior diplomats, yesterday told about 200 at a Woman's National Democratic Club luncheon.

In answer to an anonymous inquiry from the audience asking "how the CIA could be curbed from stirring up trouble abroad," Harriman replied festily:

"That's the silliest question I ever heard. Whenever the CIA has received such blame, one should look to whatever

man occupied the presidency at that time and find the proper person for that responsibility It makes me tired to think that one magazine, Ramparts, could destroy the important activities and abilities of the CIA."

Harriman, former U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union and Great Britain, former governor of New York and secretary of commerce, and now the chief American delegate to the Paris peace talks, actually was on hand in the interests of his new book, "America and Russia in a Changing World."

"I never am going to write

my complete memoirs," he said reflectively, "because I would wind up trying to prove that I always was right."

He said his present aims are "to see this unhappy war in Vietnam ended, and to insure that President Nixon is a one-term President; I think we have a very good chance of seeing that happen."

Of women's emerging role, Harriman commented that "perhaps, in the future, there will be a woman chairman of the Democratic National Committee If that happens, we men would know how to behave."